

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		21 OCT 1986
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials Date 21 OCT 1986
1. EXA/DDA		21 OCT 1986
2. DDA		21 OCT 1986
3. MS/DA		21 OCT 1986
4. ADDA		21 OCT 1986
5. DDA REGISTRY		
Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	For Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	
REMARKS		

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, dissents, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

Phone No.

5041-102

\* U.S.G.P.O.: 1983-421-529/320

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.605

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC		X		
11	IG				
12	Compt'				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	D/CCISCMS	X			
18	C/UDAC	X			
19	D/Security		X		
20	D/Exec Staff		X		
21	ES				
22					
SUSPENSE		Date _____			

Remarks

A/D Executive Secretary

21 Oct 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

ER 4864 86

21 October 1986



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Community Counterintelligence and Security  
Countermeasures Staff  
Chief, Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure Referrals to Justice

1. I reviewed the referrals which Dave Doherty sent to Justice over the years 1985 and 1986. I have also reviewed the list of unauthorized disclosures which you compiled for the year 1986 -- 69 of them to date. I also noted that some major leak stories were not included among those which Dave Doherty sent over to Justice. I assume that some of them, for example the leaks on the

[REDACTED]

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2. In any event, I'd like to know why we have three lists, the degree to which they are coextensive, and why they can't be put together on one system. If need be, I'd be ready to have a lawyer work with the unauthorized disclosure unit.

3. Also, I did not like the routine way in which we say, when we report unauthorized disclosures to Justice, "it is widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community" or some such thing. This invites Justice not to do anything with it. The unauthorized disclosures unit should be identifying the reporter and what he seemed to cover, building up a data bank which will be useful in selecting disclosures worthy of investigation.

4. In reviewing the disclosures sent over to Justice, I find quite a few that, in my view, should not have been put in the NID or which otherwise should have had a more restricted dissemination. I have asked [REDACTED] group to take a quick run-through of the disclosures sent over during 1985-86 to identify how we could have cut down on dissemination. In running through those which Dave has sent to Justice, I checked several that clearly had been disseminated too widely, and I am sure closer examination would identify still others.

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5. I'd like to have a meeting sometime later in the week with your group, the lawyers, [REDACTED] group, and Dave Gries to crystalize the campaign over the last few months of this year and the first few months of next year to get something done on unauthorized disclosures.

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William J. Casey

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SECRET



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